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A nearly universal practice among forensic DNA scientists includes mentioning an unrelated 26 
person as the possible alternative source of a DNA stain, when one in fact refers to an unknown 27 
person. Hence, experts typically express their conclusions with statements like: “The probability 28 
of the DNA evidence is X times higher if the suspect is the source of the trace than if another 29 
person unrelated to the suspect is the source of the trace.” Published forensic guidelines 30 
encourage such allusions to the unrelated person. However, as the authors show here, rational 31 
reasoning and population genetic principles do not require the conditioning of the evidential 32 
value on the unrelatedness between the unknown individual and the person of interest (e.g. a 33 
suspect). Surprisingly, this important semantic issue has been overlooked for decades, despite its 34 
potential to mislead the interpretation of DNA evidence by criminal justice system stakeholders. 35 
 36 
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1. Introduction 39 
Forensic science has been the target of severe critiques, in particular through the reports of the 40 
National Research Council in 2009 [1] and the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 41 
Technology in 2016 in the USA [2]. DNA typing was relatively spared by that storm, largely due 42 
to its strong grounding in probabilistic models to assess the weight of evidence. Nevertheless, the 43 
rendering of the weight of DNA evidence may mask fundamental interpretation issues for fact-44 
finders, where semantics and communication are of prime importance. As highlighted by a 45 
growing body of research [3-10], communication between scientists and non-scientists is far from 46 
straightforward and may cause unconscious misunderstandings. Each word is important and the 47 
burden is on forensic scientists to convey their message in an accurate, transparent, readable and 48 
efficient way. Many debates between law and forensic science experts1 underline the semantic 49 
                                                        
1 Such as for instance the interdisciplinary symposium held during the 69th American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
conference in New Orleans (USA) in 2017. In this symposium, presentations and a panel discussion bringing 
together judges, prosecutors, forensic scientists and academics brought out that forensic scientists must improve in 
expressing clearfully their results in reports and in court hearings, in particular when it comes to competing 
hypotheses their wording and what they encompass must be transparent for all stakeholders and dispel any blur 
whether conscious or not. 
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issues and call to set up solutions for a clear communication that removes any ambiguity, a sort 50 
of common language between science and justice. 51 
 52 
One semantic issue that has lingered ever since the introduction of trace DNA analyses in 53 
criminal investigations pertains to a very widespread practice: the concept of the ‘unrelated 54 
person’. Experts typically express their conclusions about the weight of DNA evidence with 55 
statements like: “The probability of the evidence is X times higher under the hypothesis that the 56 
suspect is the source of the trace than under the hypothesis that another person unrelated to the 57 
suspect is the source of the trace.” The word ‘unrelated’ has spreaded across the forensic 58 
literature since its tentative appearance in Jeffreys et al.’s initial paper on DNA fingerprints [11]. 59 
Nowadays, the word is almost always present in expert reports, scientific papers, textbooks and, 60 
importantly, forensic guidelines and recommendations. For instance, in the ENFSI Guideline for 61 
Evaluative Reporting in Forensic Science, DNA case examples mention alternative propositions 62 
considering “an (unknown) unrelated person” [12, pp. 34, 40]. Likewise, in its latest 63 
recommendations the DNA commission of the International Society of Forensic Genetics 64 
mentions "it is standard to apply the ‘unrelated’ caveat" (see footnote 6 in ref. [13]). 65 
 66 
While there is an abundant literature about the problem of how to deal with relatives in forensic 67 
genetics, curiously we found no published reference that fundamentally addresses the 68 
interpretation of the concept of ‘unrelatedness’. This issue is semantic in nature and does not 69 
challenge the validity of the mathematical models that are applied to assign the probability of 70 
DNA evidence in everyday casework. However, we are concerned about the confusion that the 71 
routine and default usage of the word ‘unrelated’ can cause among an audience of investigators, 72 
lawyers, prosecutors or fact finders over the correct meaning of calculations pertaining to DNA 73 
evidence.   74 
  75 
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2. Confusion over the ‘unrelated’ 76 
All individuals have relatives. This is a consequence of the finite size (N < ∞) of populations. 77 
Thus, suspects have relatives too. The more genes they share with them, the more challenging it 78 
may be to make conclusive inferences about the source of DNA traces. This explains why 79 
forensic experts tend to specify that the reported weight of evidence holds only if the source of 80 
the trace is unrelated to the suspect or, equivalently, that the suspect’s relatives are excluded from 81 
the pool of individuals that may be randomly drawn from the population of interest. However, 82 
since an individual is always related to any other member of the population – whether their most 83 
recent common ancestor lived one generation or thousands of years ago, conditioning on 84 
unrelatedness implies that the weight of evidence strictly applies to a non-existent fraction of the 85 
population. No doubt that forensic scientists have a more practical definition in mind when they 86 
use the word ‘unrelated’, such as “not closely related to the suspect” or “not related to a degree 87 
close enough to bias substantially the calculation of the weight of evidence”. Yet, such fuzzy 88 
definitions can be misleading. 89 
 90 
First, referring to a person unrelated to the suspect may be perceived as if the population of 91 
interest excluded (close) relatives, in a sense a form of covert exoneration2. This is because, in 92 
such a case, the set of people encompassed by the prosecution and the defence hypotheses 93 
excludes relatives, which may give the impression that both sides do not consider them as 94 
relevant. Second, one may think that relatives compromise the value of evidence. For instance, as 95 
suggested by a reporting scientist with who we discussed the issue, one may wonder if the use of 96 
the word ‘unrelated’ in the alternative proposition means that if the suspect has a brother, the 97 
weight of evidence is meaningless and the DNA evidence useless. Third, non-geneticists may 98 
think that two persons that do not fall under a usual “close relationship” category are necessarily 99 
                                                        
2 Indeed, background case information is most of the time insufficient or unavailable to assume such exclusion. This 
is not the role of the forensic scientist alone, who is left in most cases with a great deal of uncertainty about the 
relatedness factor. It may be tempting to reduce uncertainty by gathering circumstantial information about existing 
relatives through further investigations, by querying administrations or by asking directly the suspect. However, such 
information can rarely be considered as fully reliable and comprehensive. For instance, the suspect could state in 
interviews that he has brothers when in fact he has none. Administrative registers, when they exist, may be 
incomplete in particular about foreigners, and they provide official family relationships that do not always reflect 
biological relationships (e.g., illegitimate children) and certainly do not cover the full range of close to remote 
relationships. Finally, putting aside the impact on efficiency and timeliness for the case in process, one may also 
claim against bias of the forensic scientist's interpretation when gathering further circumstantial information. 
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more genetically distant than close relatives. Take the example of first cousins. Their kinship 100 
coefficient3 () is 0.0625. However, in theory there are a plethora of pedigree relationships that 101 
can lead to the exact same kinship level when two persons share several but more remote 102 
ancestors, especially in endogamous populations.  103 
 104 
Actually, forensic biologists do not seem to agree on the correct interpretation of ‘unrelated’. The 105 
issue arouse independently to authors of this paper in different contexts in Europe and North 106 
America, demonstrating similar concerns about the word ‘unrelated’ shared by practitioners and 107 
researchers in various countries. For example, in a 2012 international workshop on forensic 108 
DNA, one of us suggested that the word ‘unrelated’ should not be used anymore in expert 109 
reports. The discussion that followed among reporting scientists showed that they diverge over 110 
the interpretation and implications of this term. The issue was also brought forward in 2017 111 
within a Swiss working group dedicated to interpreting forensic evidence and expressing 112 
conclusions. Despite admitting discomfort when asked to justify the default use of the word 113 
‘unrelated’, the members decided to keep using it until the scientific literature addresses the 114 
question because, if questioned, they must refer to "the scientific state of knowledge".  115 
 116 
Moreover, the concept of unrelatedness, as applied in forensic science, disagrees with population 117 
genetic principles. Essentially, the problem arises when the absence of knowledge about the 118 
relatives of a person of interest leads the scientist to transform the ‘unknown person’ (the 119 
classical ‘random man’) into an ‘unrelated person’ upon reporting a random match probability, a 120 
likelihood ratio, or any other quantitative assessment of the DNA evidence. However, the key 121 
point for the correct interpretation of the weight of DNA evidence is not the existence of relatives 122 
per se but rather the information that one has or not about them and about their potential 123 
involvement in the case at hand. As we show in the next section, when no information about 124 
relatives is available/used, it is appropriate to apply standard equations based on the Hardy-125 
Weinberg (HW) law without conditioning the weight of evidence on the unrelatedness between 126 
the person of interest (e.g. suspect) and the source of the trace. 127 
                                                        
3 The kinship coefficient is defined as the probability of randomly drawing from different individuals two alleles that 
are identical-by-descent (IBD), i.e. due to common ancestry (e.g.,  = 0.25 for brothers). 
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3. All is relative 128 
Consider two competing hypotheses about the source of a trace, Hp and Hd, respectively proposed 129 
by the prosecution and the defence [14]. In a Bayesian framework, the strength of our belief in 130 
favour of one hypothesis over the other before observing the DNA evidence (i.e. the ratio of their 131 
prior odds), is given by Pr(Hp|I)/Pr(Hd|I), where I is any other relevant (e.g., circumstantial) 132 
information available about/for the casework. After observing the DNA evidence (E), the 133 
posterior odds become 134 










      137 
where Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑝, 𝐼)/Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑, 𝐼) is the likelihood ratio (LR). In equation (1), case information 138 
available about relatives is a component of I and we will designate it by IR. A classical example is 139 
when the suspect has a brother who is assumed to belong to the population of interest. In such a 140 
case, Hp usually remains unchanged (e.g. “the suspect is the source of the trace”) while Hd could 141 
be that “his brother is the source of the trace”, or that “another person other than the suspect, not 142 
excluding his brother, is the source”. In either case the calculation of the LR denominator must be 143 
adjusted appropriately [15]. Therefore, changing IR can modify or refine both the set of 144 
hypotheses to be evaluated and the calculation of the LR, in agreement with these hypotheses 145 
[16]4. Now, since this is true for any defence hypothesis admitting any specified relatives as the 146 
alternative source of the DNA stain [15, 18], we will not limit our consideration to the sole 147 
brother case and refer more generally to the kinship coefficient , which has a value for every 148 
degree of genetic relationship (see footnote 3).   149 
 150 
When the reporting scientist has no knowledge about the existence of relatives, then IR =  151 
(empty set). In this case, it is generally assumed that the calculation of Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑 , 𝐼) in equation 152 
(1), which is based on Hardy-Weinberg law in the simplest model, holds only when the source is 153 
                                                        
4 Concerning the assessment of multiple hypotheses in the LR calculation, we refer the reader to Buckleton et al. [17] 
J.S. Buckleton, C.M. Triggs, C. Champod, An extended likelihood ratio framework for interpreting evidence, 
Science and Justice 46(2) (2006) 69-78. 
(1) 
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unrelated to the suspect, that is  = 0 (with Hd defined accordingly). However, this is a mistake 154 
because the only thing that the calculation in the denominator entails is that the reporting scientist 155 
incorporates no relevant information about the kinship of the suspect to other persons in the 156 
population. That is, IR =  does not imply Pr( > 0) = 0, i.e. that individuals are totally unrelated. 157 
Strictly speaking, an absence of kinship between individuals is expected only in infinite 158 
populations since Pr( > 0)  0 when N  ∞ under random mating [19]. Consequently, the 159 
absence of information cannot be equated to an absence of kinship since an individual is always 160 
related somehow to any other member of the finite population. 161 
 162 
The use of the word ‘unrelated’ is even more problematic under the Balding-Nichols (BN) model 163 
[20], which is routinely applied by forensic labs in place of the HW model. This model postulates 164 
that relatedness does exist between the suspect and the source of the trace due to population 165 
subdivision, such that individuals from the same subpopulation share a common ancestry. The 166 
theta (θ) parameter of this model corrects for the non-independence of their genetic profiles by 167 
incorporating information from population genetic studies. Obviously, this means that IR ≠  and 168 
that the probability of kinship between the suspect and other persons from the same 169 
subpopulation (Pr( > 0)) is greater than zero. Consequently, it is incoherent to use the word 170 
‘unrelated’ in the formulation of the weight of evidence based on this model. 171 
 172 
Moreover, contrary to common admittance, HW or BN equations do provide correct values for 173 
the probability of a genetic profile when one admits the possible inclusion of the suspect’s 174 
relatives in the population of interest, as long as no information about these relatives is available, 175 
as demonstrated for the HW case in Appendix A. Hence, the standard random match probability 176 
must be understood as the match probability in the absence of knowledge about relatives, rather 177 
than in its common but wrong acceptance as the “match probability when no relatives exist”. A 178 
similar reasoning applies to other forms of weight-of-evidence metrics that tend to refer to 179 




4. The unrelatedness concept: an unnecessary burden 183 
To circumvent the lack of precision conveyed by reference to unrelated individuals, some authors 184 
proposed to change the calculation and presentation of the weight of evidence. In their “call for a 185 
re-examination of reporting practice”, Buckleton and Triggs [16] concluded that “it is time that 186 
the match probabilities for a sibling are reported in all casework involving many loci where the 187 
suspect has a non-excluded sibling” – a call that however appears to have had little effect on 188 
current common DNA reporting practice (see [21] for a similar argument). Likewise, Taylor et al. 189 
[22] proposed a “unified LR” that accounts for potential relatives and “removes the need to 190 
stipulate that the alternative donor is unrelated when forming the propositions” [22, p. 57]. 191 
Basically, LRs considering different types of relatives are calculated, weighted by the postulated 192 
frequency of each type of relative, and then summed up (i.e., considering that IR ≠  at 193 
population level) [22]. The STRmix™ software lets the user specify the average number of 194 
children per family (i.e., IR ≠ ), to better reflect the composition of the population of interest 195 
(see http://strmix.esr.cri.nz/#home for a list of publications relative to the methods implemented 196 
in STRmix™). As far as the assumptions about the relatedness structure are made explicit, above 197 
approaches have the advantage of considering populations that are more realistic of human 198 
mating systems than the classic ‘random mating’ scheme. However, while they address the 199 
problem of how to best quantify the weigh of evidence, they do not address the semantic issue of 200 
their verbal formulation. Indeed, they do not totally eliminate the use of the word ‘unrelated’ 201 
because an ‘unrelated’ category may still remains among the several types of relatives 202 
considered. What should we do then? 203 
 204 
First, we suggest to simply consider that if the unknown individual who left a DNA trace 205 
happened to be the brother or the cousin of the suspect, this would be a sort of ancillary 206 
consequence, a way by which we categorize and name one among many possible genetic 207 
outcomes of a random draw (the source of the DNA trace under the defence hypothesis) in a 208 
finite population. This way of expressing the relatedness avoids the pitfalls associated with the 209 
choice of an arbitrary definition of ‘unrelated’ within the forensic context. Second, referring 210 
simply to an “unknown person” or to the “random individual” is sufficient because one should 211 
not (and doesn’t need to) discard the possibility that the source is related to the suspect to an 212 
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unknown degree. Alternatively, a more explicit wording would be “an unknown person, without 213 
regard to his relatedness to the suspect”. Again, the important point here is not unrelatedness but 214 
the absence of relevant knowledge about relatives (IR = ), which prevails in most real life 215 
caseworks. Critically, in assessing the weight of the DNA evidence with standard metrics, one 216 
must nevertheless bear in mind the assumption that the suspect has no more or less chance to 217 
have relatives of a given degree than the average person in the population of interest. Therefore, 218 
it is still important to specify that potential relatives are included in the list of possible donors, 219 
especially when the set of possible suspects is small. 220 
 221 
5. Conclusion 222 
The arguments presented in this paper call for a change in reporting practices to prevent semantic 223 
confusion and potential misinterpretation of DNA evidence by fact-finders and other criminal 224 
justice system participants. We suggest avoiding the routine and default use of the word 225 
‘unrelated’, not only in oral communications and expert reports, but also in the forensic literature 226 
in general, including guidelines and recommendations.  Some might believe that this issue is 227 
unlikely to have a big influence on the interpretation of forensic DNA expertises. We doubt it is 228 
the case, considering the confusion that exists even among reporting scientists (see section 2). 229 
There is a vacuum in the literature about this question that needs to be filled. Thus, we hope this 230 
paper will spark discussion, and will be glad to hear what other people think, including scientists, 231 
investigators, prosecutors, lawyers and fact-finders supporting or mitigating our concern, whether 232 
through formal or informal replies (we opened a web page [www.uqtr.ca/lrc/unrelated] to gather 233 
comments from the readers). 234 
 235 
In all cases, future studies in criminology, psychology and law will be essential to better 236 
document the variation in the perception, both by scientists and non-scientists, of the ‘random 237 
individual’ and unrelatedness concepts, and the impact of this variation on the justice system. The 238 
perception of alternative formulations should be compared, such as the one proposed here (“an 239 
unknown person, without regard to his relatedness to the suspect”). This calls for an active 240 
collaboration between scientists and stakeholders of the criminal justice system to reduce the gap 241 
“that exists between questions lawyers are actually interested in, and the answers that scientists 242 
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deliver to Courts” [23]. Finally, while this paper focuses on the evaluative phase, it will also be 243 
important to assess how various interpretations of the unrelatedness concept could impact 244 
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APPENDIX A 313 
Hardy-Weinberg equations, or their derivations (e.g., those incorporating some form or 314 
correlation between uniting gametes such as fixation indices), are routinely applied to quantify 315 
the weight of DNA evidence. This appendix demonstrates why these equations provide correct 316 
probabilities of genetic profiles when one admits the possible inclusion of the suspect’s relatives. 317 
Strictly speaking, the Hardy-Weinberg law holds when there is no random genetic drift, which is 318 
the case when the population size N tends toward infinity. Standard forensic calculations assume 319 
that N is large enough to make negligible any bias caused by the fact that a real population is not 320 
of infinite size. From this perspective, it might seem logical to consider that calculations based on 321 
HW equations admit only “unrelated” individuals in the population of interest, since the average 322 
kinship in a given offspring generation tends toward 0 as N  ∞. However, this has no resonance 323 
for stakeholders of the justice system that have to deal with the real world, where crimes occur in 324 
populations composed of many kinds of relatives, creating unnecessary confusion around the 325 
concept of ‘unrelatedness’ (see section 2 of the main text). The perspective adopted here is 326 
different. We consider that in a finite population, Hardy-Weinberg equations provide the 327 
probability, averaged over all possible relatedness degrees, to randomly draw a given genotype. 328 
We show that admitting the existence of relatives does not bias 1) genotype frequencies in the 329 
population of interest, with respect to expectations from a reference sample, nor 2) the calculation 330 
of the match probability.  331 
 332 
Admitting relatives does not bias genotype frequencies 333 
This first point is fairly trivial. When the population is of finite size, as in real life, it will occur 334 
that two gametes will be drawn from the same reproducing individual, with a probability that is 335 
inversely proportional to the population size (all else being equals). When these two gametes 336 
carry the same parental gene copy, this will generate identity-by-descent (IBD) alleles carried by 337 
different offspring. It will also occur that gametes are drawn from individuals that are related 338 
because they share IBD alleles due to reproduction in previous generations. The current 339 
generation is thus composed of individuals related to diverse degrees as a result from the 340 
genealogical structure that has developed over time. In all logic, allele frequencies estimated from 341 
a reference sample for a population, denoted here by the vector Pref, must be coherent with this 342 
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structure because the true allele frequencies (Ppop) necessarily admit all these relatives. Therefore, 343 
E(Pref)  should equate Ppop, where E(.) denotes the expectation. This statement is denied (i.e. 344 
E(Pref) ≠ Ppop) by the very definition of Pref as reflecting only the pool of unrelated individuals. 345 
Indeed, the word ‘unrelated’ implies that Pref is meaningless for forensic purposes because it 346 
refers to a non-existent fraction of the population, underscoring the fundamental problem of using 347 
this word5.  This comes down to the issue of what is the basal population. As underscored by 348 
Lynch and Walsh [24], “Technically speaking, all members of a species or population are related 349 
to each other to some degree for the simple reason that they contain copies of genes that were 350 
present in some remote ancestor in the phylogeny. We avoid this problem by letting the reference 351 
population be the base of an observed pedigree”. While these authors raised this issue within the 352 
context of quantitative genetics, the reasoning remains true for the problem addressed here. 353 
 354 
Admitting relatives does not bias the match probability 355 
To illustrate this second point, we will consider the case where the suspect may have a brother. 356 
For the sake of simplicity we assume again a random mating population with no subdivision (i.e. 357 
HW model) although the reasoning holds under the Balding-Nichols model [20]. First, let’s 358 
postulate that the suspect has a brother who is member of the population of interest, an event that 359 
we denote by B. From equation (1) in the main text, this postulate amounts to consider that B  360 
IR, where IR denotes circumstantial information pertaining to the suspect’s relatives. Then 361 
including the possibility for the brother in the defence hypothesis (Hd) and conditioning the 362 
probability of the trace DNA profile (E) on B makes sense because B may be informative of 363 
Pr(E)6:  364 
                                                        
5 This also applies to genotypes. A key point to consider here is the following: under random mating, when assessing 
a genotype probability, it is irrelevant to consider whether or not the two gametes drawn from the parental generation 
to form the zygote were previously drawn from the same parents to create other offspring. In other words, the simple 
fact of having a brother does not influence the probability of drawing randomly one’s genotype from the same 
parental population. From a forensic perspective, this implies that when knowledge about the brother is not 
available, then the genotype probability is solely based on postulated allele frequencies. The reasoning holds for 
more remote degrees of relationships than brothers, such as cousins. When gametes are drawn randomly to create a 
new generation, the major parameters are the frequency of alleles in the parental generation and the mating system. 
Whether some of the parental alleles are IBD (implying related individuals) or simply identical-in-state (IIS) due to 
recurrent mutations is irrelevant. 
6 This is particularly true under the BN model, where knowledge of any genotype from the same subpopulation 
update the information about allele frequencies for that subpopulation. For the HW model, the brother’s genotype is 
informative of Pr(E) only if the brother is suspected more strongly than other members of the population of interest. 
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 Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑, 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑂) = Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑 , 𝐵 ∈ 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑂)       366 
 367 
Here IO refers to any other circumstantial information not pertaining to the suspect’s relatives (i.e. 368 
I = IR  IO). If, instead, we postulate that the suspect has no brother, an event denoted ?̅? then 369 
 370 
 Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑, 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑂) = Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑 , ?̅?, ?̅? ∈ 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑂).      371 
 372 
Now, consider the case where the suspect may have a brother but that we have no information 373 
about whether he does. That is IR = , which assumes that a priori the suspect is not more or less 374 
likely to have a brother than the average individual in the population. In such a case, Hd would 375 
refer to an ‘unknown person’ and can be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of the trace 376 
under both possibilities that the suspect has and does not have a brother: 377 
 378 
Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑, 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑂) = Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑 , 𝐵, 𝐵 ∉ 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑅 = ∅, 𝐼𝑂) Pr(𝐵) +379 
Pr(𝐸|𝐻𝑑, ?̅?, ?̅? ∉ 𝐼𝑅 , 𝐼𝑅 = ∅, 𝐼𝑂) Pr(?̅?) (A.1) 380 
In the absence of knowledge about a suspect’s relative, recognizing the possibility that he may 381 
have a brother (Pr(B) > 0) does not invalidate the use of HW (or BN) equations to quantify the 382 
probability that a random man is the source of the trace. To demonstrate this, we must consider 383 
three possibilities of a match between the suspect and trace DNA profiles, under the defence 384 
hypothesis. Thus either: 385 
1. the suspect has a brother who carries the same genotype as him, and the brother is the 386 
unknown individual who left the DNA trace; 387 
2. the suspect has a brother but another unknown individual carrying the same genotype as 388 
the suspect left the DNA trace; 389 
3. the suspect has no brother and an unknown individual carrying the same genotype as the 390 
suspect left the DNA trace. 391 
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Summing up probabilities for these three events recovers the genotype probability expected under 392 
HW, at least when assuming the typical hypergeometric distribution of genotype frequencies 393 
([25]; see next section). In other words, the brother could be the unknown man who left the DNA 394 
trace. This would not bias the calculation because this hypothesis is not explicitly evaluated with 395 
HW equations (and assuming that the reporting scientist doesn’t know about his existence or non-396 
existence)7. 397 
 398 
Random match probability 399 
Let GUK be the profile of the unknown who presumably left the DNA trace (under the defence 400 
hypothesis) and GS that of the suspect. For convenience, we can equate GUK with the random 401 
match probability (RMP) since the observation of the first copy of the genotype does not change 402 
the probability of observing the second copy under the Hardy-Weinberg model. To assess the 403 
impact of admitting that the brother of a suspect (or person of interest) could be the unknown 404 
person who left the DNA trace (the ‘random man’), we need to consider the sampling of 405 
genotypes in a population. Since we have no knowledge about the suspect’s relatives (in our 406 
notation: IR = ), it is assumed that the probability that the suspect has a brother is the same as 407 
that for the average person in the population. For commodity and without loss of generality, we 408 
consider that the probability that the unknown (UK) is a brother (or full sib (FS)) of the suspect is 409 
equivalent to the probability of randomly drawing two gametes from the parental population, one 410 
from each of the suspect’s parent: 411 
Pr(UK=FS) = Pr(1 gamete is from the suspect’s mother  1 gamete is from suspect’s father). 412 
Under random mating, and assuming a hypergeometric distribution of genotype frequencies in a 413 
population of finite size N, Following Weir [25]: 414 
Pr(UK = FS) ~ h(k = 2, N, K = 2,n = 2) 415 
where k is the number of success (i.e. drawing a gamete from a suspect’s parent), K is the number 416 
of parents of the suspect and n is the number of draws. Another outcome possible is that one 417 
                                                        
7 Note that under the random mating model one expects many more half sibs than full sibs in a population. While this 
is generally unrealistic for human populations, it is nevertheless the model underlying ‘random man’ type 
calculations for finite populations. 
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gamete is drawn from a suspect’s parent and the other is drawn from an unknown individual, so 418 
that the random man who left the trace would be a half sib (HS) of the suspect. Finally, the last 419 
possible outcome is that the two gametes come from two unknown individuals, thus the random 420 
man is a “non-sib” (NS). The probability of these two outcomes can also be calculated from the 421 
hypergeometric distribution and 422 
Pr(UK = FS)+Pr(UK =HS)+Pr(UK =NS)=1 423 
Note that “non-sib” does not mean ‘unrelated’. 424 
As an example, let’s suppose that the suspect has the heterozygous profile a/b. We need to 425 
evaluate the following expression:  426 
Pr(GUK = a / b) = Pr(GUK = a / b UK = FS,GS = a / b)Pr(UK = FS)
                           +Pr(GUK = a / b UK = HS,GS = a / b)Pr(UK = HS)
                           +Pr(GUK = a / b UK = NS,GS = a / b)Pr(UK = NS)
 427 
 428 
We considered two different models and performed RMP calculations independently under each 429 
of these models. 430 
 Model 1=Fixed allele frequencies: the postulated (reference; Pref) allele frequencies pa and pb for 431 
the population of size N are fixed. That is, if pa = 0.1 and N = 10000, there are exactly 0.1 x 2 x 432 
10000 = 2000 copies of allele a in the population. In such a population, the probability of a a/b 433 
heterozygote will be slightly upwardly biased relative to that in an infinite size population: 434 
2pa(2N*pb)/(2N-1) > 2papb . 435 
 Model 2=Random allele frequencies: allele counts in the finite population are a random draw of 436 
2N alleles based on the postulated (reference) allele frequencies. In other words, the population of 437 
size N behaves as a random sample (one possible realization) from a very large (infinite) 438 
population having the postulated allele frequencies. In such a population of size N, the probability 439 
of the a/b heterozygote is slightly biased downwardly due to the negative covariance of allele 440 
counts: E(2papb) = 2papb – papb /N  [25]. 441 
 442 
Given the suspect’s genotype, the possible genotypic states for his parents, that is, for two of the 443 
individuals who belong to the finite (parental) population, are limited to those that can give birth 444 
to an a/b offspring (e.g. mother a/a – father b/b, mother a/x – father b/x, where x is any allele 445 
different from a and b). Thus, the approach used here is to evaluate Pr(GUK = a / b UK = FS) , 446 
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Pr(GUK = a / b UK =HS) and Pr(GUK = a / b UK =NS) by considering each pair of possible 447 
suspect’s parent pair, weighted by its probability. 448 
 449 
Table A1 provides examples of the values obtained for the RMP as calculated using standard HW 450 
equations compared to those calculated using the approach described here (“RMP brother”). We 451 
note that the “RMP brother” is generally equal to the standard RMP for a given set of parameters 452 
N, pa and pb. The reader will note that the “RMP brother” tends to overestimate very slightly the 453 
standard RMP, but the difference is negligible even for very small populations of interest. For 454 
instance, in the worse case shown in Table A1 (i.e. under model 2, when N=100, pa=0.5 and 455 
pb=0.1), “RMP brother”/“RMP std”= 1.000613 instead of 1. This is due to the effect of the 456 
knowledge of the suspect’s genotype on the RMP for a finite population (which is a different 457 
issue than the one addressed here). This effect is due to the negative covariance of genotypic 458 
counts and increases with decreasing N. In other words, the observation of GS update our 459 
knowledge of realized genotype frequencies in the population due to the constraint that allele 460 
frequencies are either fixed (model 1) or random draw from a very large (infinite) population 461 
having the postulated (reference) allele frequencies. Therefore, observing GS = a/b implies that 462 
one of the 2Npa copies of allele a, and one of the 2Npb copies of allele b, in the population, are 463 
found together in the suspect, meaning that other genotypes existing in the population must be 464 
made from the remaining 2Npa -1 and 2Npb -1 copies, limiting possible values for genotype 465 
counts in an increasing manner with decreasing N (independently of the suspect’s relatives issue). 466 
 467 
  468 
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Table A.1 Values obtained for the standard random match probability (“RMP std”) and the 469 
random match probability accounting for the possibility that the brother is the random man 470 
(“RMP brother”, which also includes the possibility for half sib), for a heterozygote a/b and 471 
various settings of N, pa and pb (assuming =0). The standard RMP for model 2 integrates the 472 
expected difference in the genotype frequencies in a finite population (2papb – papb /N) that is a 473 
random draw from an infinite population (2papb) [25]. 474 
   Model 1: fixed allele 
frequencies 
Model 2: random allele 
frequencies 
pa pb N RMP std 
RMP 
brother RMP std 
RMP 
brother 
0.1 0.1 ∞ 0.02000000 0.02000000 0.02000000 0.02000000 
  1,000,000 0.02000001 0.02000001 0.01999999 0.01999999 
  10,000 0.02000100 0.02000100 0.01999900 0.01999900 
  1,000 0.02001001 0.02001001 0.01999000 0.01999020 
  100 0.02010050 0.02010071 0.01990000 0.01992015 
0.5 0.1 ∞ 0.10000000 0.10000000 0.10000000 0.10000000 
  1,000,000 0.10000010 0.10000010 0.09999995 0.09999995 
  10,000 0.10000500 0.10000500 0.09999500 0.09999501 
  1,000 0.10005000 0.10005000 0.09995000 0.09995006 
  100 0.10050250 0.10050260 0.09950000 0.09956099 
 475 
 476 
